CVE-2026-89541 (CVSS 9.8)

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks gss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base; if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf); Both operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with opaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small value that is below rcv_buf->len, so the bound check passes and gss_unwrap() is called with end < begin. The check also lacks a lower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is accepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt header reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token. A krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive the client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the rotate_left() loop that follows. Fix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that are safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum outer token length: if (offset > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) goto unwrap_failed; The first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard unconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful xdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already satisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added in commit 5b757c2e57a5 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length").

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CVSS v3.1 Score

9.8

CRITICAL

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS — Exploit Prediction

0.0052

Probability of exploitation

0.43%

Percentile rank

EPSS estimates the probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. A higher score means more likely to be exploited.

References

Other References

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3691c4b3488d8ca046b9941e5be30c626dbbbb50 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401f6a5b338d05bb1069ad814d9f77e3c367854f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81fd7654a8429718adfcb2a7e03496077f547ed0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85fa6b12e8f439739ac36ef2aad925f37c8b976a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87831b92112c81db251d46756d65daa4f91af6a2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89a15a50f84d32d4b99db86f957427fcbe20a99a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d395c30d570ca6168f0297b191709927d1258273 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebcbd2523a8524c3d24e111cdbed8e271d910269

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-89541? +

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks gss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base; if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf); Both operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with opaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small value that is below rcv_buf->len, so the bound check passes and gss_unwrap() is called with end < begin. The check also lacks a lower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is accepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt header reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token. A krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive the client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the rotate_left() loop that follows. Fix by replacing the single combined check with three guards that are safe in u32 arithmetic and that enforce the RFC 4121 minimum outer token length: if (offset > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len > rcv_buf->len - offset) goto unwrap_failed; if (opaque_len < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) goto unwrap_failed; The first guard makes the subtraction in the second guard unconditionally safe; offset is derived from a successful xdr_inline_decode() in the head kvec, so in practice it already satisfies the bound. The floor mirrors the server-side check added in commit 5b757c2e57a5 ("SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length"). It has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (CRITICAL).

How severe is CVE-2026-89541? +

CVE-2026-89541 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8 out of 10, rated CRITICAL. This is a critical vulnerability that should be patched immediately. The EPSS score is 0.0052, placing it in the 0th percentile for exploitation probability.

How do I check if I'm vulnerable to CVE-2026-89541? +

You can use Secably's free Website Scanner to check your website for known vulnerabilities. For infrastructure scanning, use the Port Scanner to identify exposed services that may be affected. Check the vendor advisories linked above for specific patch and version information.

CVE-2026-89541